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Abstract. An example is given in which agents agree to disagree, showing that
Aumann’s (1976) Agreement Theorem does not extend to a countable space of
equiprobable states of nature. Even in this unorthodox setting, if the sets of the
information partitions are intervals, an agreement theorem holds. A result that
describes the margin for disagreement is also obtained.
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1 Introduction
The axiom of countable additivity states that given a countable set of disjoint
events, the probability of occurrence of one of them is equal to the sum of the
probabilities of the individual events. It is central to measure-theoretic proba-
bility theory, in spite of some controversy on whether it should be regarded as a
normative principle or as a technical convenience.
As explained by Stinchcombe (1997), the framework for decision making under
uncertainty built by Savage (1954) does not guarantee that subjective proba-
bilities satisfy countable additivity, and this opens the way to paradoxes such
as money pumps and indifference between an act and another that pointwise
dominates it. A related paradox is presented here.
De Finetti (1974) claimed that probability theory should allow for the case of a
uniform distribution over a countably infinite set of possibilities. This setting,
which violates countable additivity, is the one that is considered in this paper.1
Aumann (1976) established the Agreement Theorem: if two agents have the same
priors, and if their posteriors for an event are commonly known by both, then
they must be equal. The insight provided by this beautiful result is that if agents
have different expectations, then they must revise them taking into account the
opinion of the others. This process can only stop when expectations coincide. An
important consequence is that agents never engage in speculative trade (Milgrom
& Stokey, 1982).
This result holds in the general setup considered in economic theory. The common
1Suppose that countable additivity held. If the probability of an individual possibility were
strictly positive, then, the probability of the whole would be infinite. If the probability of an
individual possibility were null, then, the probability of the whole would also be null. In any
case, there is a contradiction with the notion that the probability of the whole universe is 1.
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prior of the agents is a compact probability measure space, and the agent’s private
information is described by a partition of the state space (after receiving his
private information, an agent knows which set of his private information partition
includes the actual state of nature).
In this paper, an example is given showing that Aumann’s (1976) Agreement
Theorem does not extend to a countable space of equiprobable states of nature.
In such a setting, the common prior assumption does not guarantee agreement.
Agents may agree to disagree.
This equiprobability among a countable number of states constitutes an improper
common prior: a σ-finite measure that assigns the same positive probability to
each state of nature. Under this improper prior, the probabilities that an agent
attributes to events are ill-defined, but the posterior probabilities may be well-
defined (Heifetz, 2006).2
With the state space identified with the natural numbers, it makes sense to define
the probability of an event as the limit of its relative frequency, which is known
as the frequency probability. It may happen that we have to settle for lower and
upper probabilities, defined as the infimum limit and the supremum limit of the
relative frequency. This may be seen as reflecting a sort of bounded rationality.
In order to get positive results, a regularity assumption on the information struc-
tures is imposed: the sets of the partitions of information are assumed to be
intervals. Under this assumption, the ability of agents to distinguish different
states of nature is related to the natural ordering. If an agent believes that the
true state of nature can be state 7 or state 9, then the agent cannot rule out the
possibility that the true state is 8.
2For a detailed technical treatment, see the exposition on conditional probabilities and desin-
tegration of measures by Chang and Pollard (1997).
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This assumption brings some discomfort, lessened by the fact that, for an agree-
ment theorem to hold, some assumption on the partitions involving the order
on the naturals is necessary. Assuming that the sets of the partitions are inter-
vals is more acceptable if the states of nature can be identified with imperfectly
observable physical quantities like temperature or speed.
An agreement theorem is shown for this setting: if the agent’s posterior proba-
bilities are common information, then they are equal.
If only lower and upper prior probabilities exist, then there is a margin for dis-
agreement. If common information is not significantly informative, it can only be
guaranteed that the commonly known posteriors are between the lower and the
upper prior probabilities.
The paper continues with the presentation of the model, in section 2, that also
includes an agreement result and a result that describes the margin for disagree-
ment. In section 3, we give an example that illustrates our results.
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2 Agreement and Margin for Disagreement
In this section, we set up the model and obtain two results. One gives sufficient
conditions for agreement (Theorem 1), and the other describes the possibilities
of disagreement (Theorem 2).
Let the set of equally probable possible states of nature be IN.
An event (set of states), E ⊆ IN, is described by its characteristic function:
xE = {xEs }s∈IN, with xEs = 1 if s ∈ E, and xEs = 0 if s /∈ E.
The probability of an event is the limit of the ratio of favorable cases over possible
cases (relative frequency). The probability of an event is well defined if and only
if the upper and lower probabilities coincide.
Definition 1 (probabilities)
Let pn(E) =
1
n
n∑
s=1
xEs . Define:
p(E) = lim inf
n→+∞ pn(E);
p(E) = lim sup
n→+∞
pn(E);
p(E) = lim
n→+∞ pn(E).
The probability of E conditional on A is defined in a similar way.
Definition 2 (conditional probabilities)
Given two sets E and A, let pn(E|A) =
n∑
s=1
xEs x
A
s /
n∑
s=1
xAs , Define:
p(E|A) = lim inf
n→+∞ pn(E|A);
p(E|A) = lim sup
n→+∞
pn(E|A);
p(E|A) = lim
n→+∞ pn(E|A).
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The information of agent A is described by a partition of IN, such that the agent
does not distinguish the true state of nature, t, from those that belong to the
same set of the partition, PA(t).
After receiving its information, agent A knows that the true state of nature, t,
belongs to PA(t). The characteristic function of PA(t) is x
A(t) = {xA(t)s }s∈IN, with
xA(t)s = 1 if s ∈ PA(t), and xA(t)s = 0 if s /∈ PA(t).
The posterior probability that agent A attributes to the event E in state t is
defined as follows.
Definition 3 (posterior probability)
Let pn(E|PA(t)) =
n∑
s=1
xEs x
A(t)
s /
n∑
s=1
xA(t)s . Define:
p(E|PA(t)) = lim inf
n→+∞ pn(E|PA(t)).
p(E|PA(t)) = lim sup
n→+∞
pn(E|PA(t)).
p(E|PA(t)) = lim
n→+∞ pn(E|PA(t)).
We restrict the analysis to the case in which the sets in the agent’s information
structures (partitions of IN) are intervals.
Assumption 1 (partitions composed by intervals)
∀s ∈ IN : PA(s) and PB(s) are intervals.
This assumption implies that the partitions are either composed by an infinite
number of finite sets or a finite number of finite sets and one single infinite interval.
We are mostly concerned on the former case, in which it is guaranteed that the
posterior probabilities are well defined.
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Following Aumann (1976), the common information can be described by a par-
tition: the meet of the agents individual partitions, that is, the finest common
coarsening of PA and PB.
Definition 4 (common information structure)
The common information of agents A and B is described by P = PA ∧ PB.
Proposition 1
If PA and PB are composed by intervals, then P = PA ∧ PB is also composed by
intervals.
Proof.
By definition of common knowledge, we know that P (s) is both a union of sets
in PA and a union of sets in PB.
P (s) =
⋃
j∈JA
P jA =
⋃
j∈JB
P jB.
Suppose that the set P (s) is not an interval, and decompose it into the coarsest
intervals that compose it.
P (s) =
⋃
c∈JC
P c(s).
A set in JA cannot intersect two sets in JC , because, being an interval, it would
also contain the states between these two sets in JC . This would contradict the
fact that P jA is contained in P (s). Each P
c(s) is, therefore, also a union of sets
in PA and a union of sets in PB.
P c(s) =
⋃
j∈JcA
P jA =
⋃
j∈JcB
P jB.
This means that P c(s) is an element of P = PA∧PB, and, therefore, P c(s) = P (s).
Contradiction.
QED
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In the cases where disagreement is possible, the posterior conditional on common
information coincides with the prior.
Proposition 2
If P (t) is an infinite interval, then p(x|P (t)) = p(x) and p(x|P (t)) = p(x)
Proof.
Since P (t) is an interval and is infinite, it is equal to the set of natural numbers
that are greater than some number, N .
p(x|P (t)) = lim inf
n→+∞
∑n
s=1 asxs∑n
s=1 as
=
= lim inf
n→+∞
∑N
s=1 asxs +
∑n
s=N+1 asxs∑N
s=1 as +
∑n
s=N+1 as
=
= lim inf
n→+∞
0 +
∑n
s=N+1 xs
0 + n−N = lim infn→+∞
∑n
s=N+1 xs
n−N .
It is easy to verify that this coincides with p(x), as a finite number of terms is
always negligible among an infinite sample.
lim inf
n→+∞
∑n
s=N+1 xs
n−N = lim infn→+∞
∑n
s=1 xs
n
= p(x).
QED
The main results of this paper are based on the following lemma.
Lemma 1
Let t ∈ IN be a state of nature, PA and PB be partitions composed by intervals,
P = PA ∧ PB represent the common information, and x ⊆ IN be an event. Then:
i) If it is common knowledge at t that p(x|PA(t)) = qA, then qA ≥ p(x|P (t)).
ii) If it is common knowledge at t that p(x|PA(t)) = qA, then qA ≤ p(x|P (t)).
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Proof.
Consider the partition describing the common information, P = PA ∧ PB. The
set of this partition that contains t is P (t). It is both a union of sets in PA and
a union of sets in PB:
P (t) =
⋃
j∈JA(t) P
j
A =
⋃
j∈JB(t) P
j
B.
Since the posterior lower probability, p(x|PA(t)) = qA, is common information:
∀s ∈ P (t): p(x|PA(s)) = qA.
Let aj = {ajs}s∈IN and c = {cs}s∈IN represent the events P jA and P (t), respectively.
∀s ∈ IN : ∑
j∈JA(t)
ajs = cs.
If P (t) is finite, all P jA are also finite, and JA(t) is finite (suppose that the number
of sets in JA(t) is T ).
∃Nc ∈ IN : s > Nc ⇒ cs = ajs = 0, ∀j = 1, ..., T .
In this finite case, the actual probability is surely well defined. With some ma-
nipulation, we obtain that p(x|P (t)) = qA.
p(x|P (t)) =
∑Nc
s=1 xscs∑Nc
s=1 cs
=
∑Nc
s=1
∑T
j=1 xsa
j
s∑Nc
s=1 cs
=
T∑
j=1
(∑Nc
s=1 xsa
j
s∑Nc
s=1 a
j
s
∑Nc
s=1 a
j
s∑Nc
s=1 cs
)
=
=
T∑
j=1
qA
∑Nc
s=1 a
j
s∑Nc
s=1 cs
= qA
∑T
j=1
∑Nc
s=1 a
j
s∑Nc
s=1 cs
= qA
∑Nc
s=1
∑T
j=1 a
j
s∑Nc
s=1 cs
= qA
∑Nc
s=1 cs∑Nc
s=1 cs
= qA.
Of course that lower and upper probabilities necessarily coincide with the actual
probability.
p(x|P (t)) = p(x|P (t)) = p(x|P (t)) = qA = qA = qA.
The interesting case is when P (t) infinite.
If P (t) is infinite, then either JA(t) is finite with the last set being infinite, or
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JA(t) is infinite and made up by finite sets.
Let’s start with the case in which JA(t) is finite, with the last set, P
T
A having an
infinite number of states. Denote by Na the last state that belongs to P
T−1
A .
s > Na ⇒ ajs = 0 ∧ aTs = cs,∀j = 1, ..., T − 1.
Below, we manipulate the sequence of truncated conditional probabilities of the
event x conditional on P (t). Recall that p(x|P (t)) is the liminf of this sequence.∑n
s=1 xscs∑n
s=1 cs
=
∑T
j=1
∑n
s=1 xsa
j
s∑n
s=1 cs
=
=
T−1∑
j=1
(∑n
s=1 xsa
j
s∑n
s=1 a
j
s
∑n
s=1 a
j
s∑n
s=1 cs
)
+
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
∑n
s=1 a
T
s∑n
s=1 cs
=
=
T−1∑
j=1
(∑NA
s=1 xsa
j
s∑NA
s=1 a
j
s
∑NA
s=1 a
j
s∑n
s=1 cs
)
+
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
∑n
s=1 a
T
s∑n
s=1 cs
=
=
T−1∑
j=1
qA
∑NA
s=1 a
j
s∑n
s=1 cs
+
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
∑n
s=1 a
T
s∑n
s=1 cs
=
= qA
∑NA
s=1
∑T−1
j=1 a
j
s∑n
s=1 cs
+
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
∑n
s=1 a
T
s∑n
s=1 cs
=
= qA
∑NA
s=1 cs∑n
s=1 cs
+
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
∑n
s=1 a
T
s∑n
s=1 cs
.
With P (t) infinite,
∑n
s=1 cs grows to infinity, thus the first term is negligible. We
proceed to show that, in this case, p(x|P (t)) = q
A
p(x|P (t)) = lim inf
n→+∞
∑n
s=1 xscs∑n
s=1 cs
= lim inf
n→+∞ qA
∑NA
s=1 cs∑n
s=1 cs
+
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
∑n
s=1 a
T
s∑n
s=1 cs
=
= lim inf
n→+∞
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
∑n
s=1 a
T
s∑n
s=1 cs
= lim inf
n→+∞
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
∑n
s=Na cs∑n
s=1 cs
=
= lim inf
n→+∞
∑n
s=1 xsa
T
s∑n
s=1 a
T
s
= q
A
.
It remains to be considered the case in which JA is infinite and made up by finite
elements. Denote by n(j) the last state included in the set P jA. It is obvious that
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j ≤ n(j) and that s > n(j)⇒ ajs = 0.
As before, the probability of x conditional on P (t) is a limit of a sequence of
truncated probability calculations.
p(x|P (t)) = lim inf
n→+∞
∑n
s=1 xscs∑n
s=1 cs
= lim inf
n→+∞
∑
j∈JA
∑n
s=1 xsa
j
s∑n
s=1 cs
.
The liminf of the following subsequence cannot, by definition, be higher than the
liminf of the original sequence.
p(x|P (t)) ≤ lim inf
k→+∞
∑k
j=1
∑n(k)
s=1 xsa
j
s∑n(k)
s=1 cs
= lim inf
k→+∞
k∑
j=1
∑n(k)s=1 xsajs∑n(k)
s=1 a
j
s
∑n(k)
s=1 a
j
s∑n(k)
s=1 cs
 =
= lim inf
k→+∞
k∑
j=1
q
A
∑n(k)
s=1 a
j
s∑n(k)
s=1 cs
 = lim inf
k→+∞
q
A
∑k
j=1
∑n(k)
s=1 a
j
s∑n(k)
s=1 cs
=
= lim
k→+∞
q
A
∑n(k)
s=1 cs∑n(k)
s=1 cs
= q
A
.
In this remaining case, p(x|P (t)) ≤ q
A
. The proof of i) is complete. The same
reasoning applies to prove ii).
QED
The following agreement theorem is a corollary of Lemma 1.
Theorem 1 (agreement theorem)
Let t ∈ IN be a state of nature, x ⊆ IN be an event, PA and PB be partitions
composed by intervals, and P = PA ∧ PB. If it is common knowledge at t that
p(x|PA(t)) = qA and that p(x|PB(t)) = qB, then qA = qB = p(x|P (t)).
Proof.
This result is a corollary of Lemma 1.
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Since it is common knowledge at t that p(x|PA(t)) = qA, then it is common
knowledge at t that p(x|PA(t)) = qA and that p(x|PA(t)) = qA.
By Lemma 1, q ≤ qA ≤ q.
But the fact that p(x|P (t)) = q means that q = q = q. Therefore: qA = q.
The same argument shows that qB = q.
QED
The following result, establishing the margin for disagreement, is a straightfor-
ward corollary of Lemma 1. The proof is omitted.
Theorem 2 (margin for disagreement theorem)
Let t ∈ IN be a state of nature, x ⊆ IN be an event, PA and PB be partitions
composed by intervals, and P = PA ∧ PB. Let p(x|P (t)) = q and p(x|P (t)) = q.
If it is common knowledge at t that p(x|PA(t)) = qA and that p(x|PB(t)) = qB,
then q ≤ qA ≤ q and q ≤ qB ≤ q.
Notice that if P (t) is finite, then there is no margin for disagreement. If P (t) is
infinite, then (by Proposition 2), the lower and upper posteriors conditional on
common information coincide with the lower and upper priors. Therefore, in the
cases where disagreement is possible, p(x) ≤ qA ≤ p(x) and p(x) ≤ qB ≤ p(x).
Assuming that the sets of the partitions are intervals may be criticized on the
grounds that it involves the order on IN. This is more acceptable if states of
nature refer to imperfectly observable physical quantities like mass, temperature
or luminous intensity. In any case, an assumption of this kind is needed for an
agreement result to hold.
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Suppose that no assumption on the partitions is made, and consider an event
E with lim
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
s=1
xEs ∈ (0, 1). For any rational numbers qA and qB, we can
construct partitions such that the posteriors qA and qB are common knowledge.
For example, to construct PA with a posterior qA = 1/2 that is uniform (and,
therefore, common knowledge), simply let P 1A contain only the first number in E
and the first number not in E, let P 2A contain only the second number in E and
the second number not in E, etc.3
Nevertheless, it is clear that the assumption that the elements of the partitions are
intervals may be relaxed. It would be of interest to find necessary and sufficient
conditions for the agreement theorem to hold.
3I thank for this interesting remark.
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3 An Example of Agreeing to Disagree
Ann and Bob face a countable set of equally probable states of nature, that we
denote by Ω = {1, 2, ...}.
Ann and Bob have different observation capabilities, described by partitions of Ω.
These are such that what is observed is the element of the partition that contains
the actual state of nature. Their private information partitions are, respectively:
PA = {{1, 2, 3}, {3 + 1, ..., 22 · 3}, ..., {22k · 3 + 1, ..., 22k+2 · 3}, ...};
PB = {{1, ..., 2 · 3}, {2 · 3 + 1, ..., 23 · 3}, ..., {22k−1 · 3 + 1, ..., 22k+1 · 3}, ...}.
Ann and Bob are curious about whether the event described as follows occurred:
X = {1, 2} ∪ {2 · 3 + 1, 22 · 3} ∪ ... ∪ {2(2k+1) · 3 + 1, 2(2k+2) · 3} ∪ ... .
All this is common information. The space of states, the information structures,
and the event are described in the picture below. Notice that in every set of
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Ann’s information structure, the event X occurs in two thirds of the states of
nature; while in every set of Bob’s information structure, X occurs in only one
third of the states.
Having received their private information (that is, knowing in which set of their
partition of information is the actual state of nature), Ann will estimate that the
probability of occurrence of X is 2/3, and Bob will estimate that it is 1/3. This
is common knowledge, since it is independent of the state of nature that occurs.
For the same reason, truthful exchange of information about their estimates does
not lead to any update of their posteriors.
Pooling their information, Ann and Bob are always able to find out whether X
occurred or not, except if the state of nature belongs to {1, 2, 3}. Being restricted
to truthful communication of their probability beliefs, Ann and Bob always (agree
to) disagree on the probability of occurrence of X.
After receiving their private information, Ann and Bob focus on a finite number of
states and thus have well defined subjective posterior probabilities. But the prior
probability of X is undetermined. As we advance in the naturals, the proportion
of states that belong to X oscillates between 1/3 and 2/3.
As we have shown in the previous section, this lack of convergence is crucial
to the posterior disagreement. We can only be sure that the commonly known
posteriors are between 1/3 and 2/3. This is the margin for disagreement. In fact,
Ann’s posterior is 2/3 and Bob’s posterior is 1/3. They agree to disagree.
15
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Download available at: 
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